The Tyrant defying the Will of the People
The issue of an all-Ethiopia resistance forum
Part three
June 16, 2006
Kahsay Berhe E-mail: bkahsay@aol.com
4. Power base of Meles Zenawi
EPRDF does not, and even TPLF does not, represent the people of Tigray. And the Tigrigna speaking population should not be identified with EPRDF. The EPRDF is an armed organization which is trying to impose its will by force and has a militia largely recruited from Tigray. In spite of this, it is not possible to identify the Tigrigna speaking population with the actions, policies and so forth of EPRDF. I think we have to put the two absolutely apart. And mixing up of the two, the EPRDF and the Tigrigna speaking population of Ethiopia is pregnant with an extremely serious danger. (Professor Mesfin Wolde Mariam , Interview with ER, 1992)
Is Tigray the main base of Meles Zenawi’s power? One can answer this question with yes and no. TPLF leaders are Tigreans from both sides of the Mereb River. Most of them belong to the same clan. Sebhat Nega and two members of his family along with their spouses are members of the Central Committee and Politburo of the TPLF. Meles Zenawi and Sebhat Nega and their relatives make up the core of the TPLF leadership and the Ethiopian regime. This group had brought havoc and wreaks to the people and forced them to live within insecure borders.
The TPLF had shown little interest in alleviating the suffering of the people of Tigray. At the peak of the 1985 famine, the TPLF requested cash instead of provisions from the donor countries and charity organizations. TPLF presented a project to the donor bodies that pretended to buy grain from the surplus regions in Tigray and distribute it to people in famine stricken areas. In reality, the cash was not intended to meet the requirement of the people. Let us see: Max Peberdy writes:
The 300,000 Pound Sterling had been given by a range of charities, Christian Aid, Norwegian Church Aid, Dutch Iner Church Aid, and so on. These organizations needed to show to supporters that the money really does get there and so we had been sent to inspect the grain, hand over the cash, receive the contract, and follow each purchase through to distribution.” (Tigray: Ethiopia’s Untold Story, London: September 1985, p. 27)
The picture in Max Peberdy’s book, the person posing as the big merchant is that of Gebre Medihin Araya, who was a regular fighter and a treasurer of the TPLF. Gebremedhin left the TPLF later on and exposed how he was camouflaged as a grain merchant under the instructions of TPLF authorities.
The grain, which belonged to the TPLF, was there mainly to be shown to the aid workers from abroad. The TPLF retained the money as well as the grain after the show. Only a small fraction of the famine aid went to the people.
A great deal of that money was redirected to the party treasury. Only 5% of the aid received by the organization was allocated to the famine victims in Tigray. The rest, 95%, was deposited in foreign banks. The organization bought houses and estate in Europe (three big houses in London alone) and in America in the second half of the 1980s. (Kahsay Berhe 2005, p.276)
Was it really the people of Tigray that kept Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in power? The answer is no!Power center is in Addis Ababa and Meles Zenawi cannot reign and suppress the people without the collaboration of the OPDO, ANDM and the SPDO and others. These marionette organizations are doing all the dirty work for Meles Zenawi and his group. They supported and executed the policy of suppression of the people of Ethiopia. The puppet parliament accepted and legitimized all policies drafted by Meles Zenawi including those that undermined the future of Ethiopia without discussion.
In all Ethiopian national issues, Tigreans have done their share. Ethiopian consciousness is deep-rooted in Tigray. The people of Tigray contributed conspicuously to the struggle of the Ethiopian people for justice, democracy, sovereignty and equality. The role of Tigreans in the Ethiopian peasant and student movement, trade union campaign, movement of the armed forces and the Ethiopian multiethnic political organizations is exemplary.
In the mid 1970s, the EDU, EPRP and the TPLF were waging war against the Dergue in Tigray. Tigrean young women and men made up the bulky of the armies of these armed movements. The EDU and EPRP/A did not have problems with the Tigrean peasants because of their multi-ethnic political programs. On this issue, I think the Ethiopian veterans from the EPRP have the obligation to talk about the people they once called them ‘our children’.
Although a clique from Tigray heads the perpetrators in Ethiopia, the repression of the people of Tigray is at least as intensive as in the other regions. The darkest media blackout in Ethiopia is in Tigray. The relative size of prison and beggar population is the highest in Tigray. The plight and resentment among the peasants in Tigray is evident.
The Norwegian observer group in 1995 witnessed that . . .
... There was no great exuberance even among the Tigreans who, from their point of view may claim to be the victors. A Norwegian observer drove through major parts of Tigray province before, during and after the election, and did not observe any popular spontaneous dancing or festivities. . . . Therefore, we may assume that the disinterest shown towards the political process by peasants throughout Ethiopia expressed some other sentiments than pure apathy, hence holds another hidden character. (The Process of Democratization in Ethiopia, Tronvoll & Aadland Oslo 1995, P43)
It is a fact that the core of TPLF controls state power in Ethiopia. Its power base varies in space and time. Between 1991 and 1995, Meles Zenawi made the Headquarters of the MLLT/TPLF his power center. Until 2001, Meles Zenawi continued to depend on the Politburo and the Headquarters of the MLLT/TPLF. The Central Committee and Politburo of the TPLF collapsed amid internal squabbling and power struggle in 2001. Many of Meles Zenawi’s long time trusted lieutenants turned their back on him, so, from 2002 to 2005 Meles Zenawi shifted his power base to the EPRDF headquarters, where he promoted some leaders in the ANDM and the OPDO.
In the May 2005 elections, opposition candidates defeated many of the newly promoted lieutenants of Meles Zenawi such as Bereket, Addisu, and Abadula etc. Meles Zenawi made the ENEB and the courts look into the re-election of the defeated cadres from the surrogate organizations. Although they were declared elected in a rerun, Meles Zenawi cannot depend on these cadres because they are rejected by the people and therefore, they could no more cheat and control the people in their regions.
Therefore, Meles Zenawi shifted his power center from the Headquarters of the EPRDF to the office of the Prime Minster. He retained the important posts like defense, foreign and interior in the hands of the TPLF. He formed super ministers in the name of advisers who practically control all ministries according to the directives by Meles Zenawi. These "super" ministers are mainly Tigrigna speaking people from Tigray and Eritrea (Berket Simon, Abay Tsehaye, Mulugeta Alemseged, Newaye-Kiristos Gebre-Ab, Dr. Fasil Nahom, etc). The selection of the advisors is based on loyalty to Meles Zenawi. Were the interest of the land and good governance at the center, Meles Zenawi could have included advisors from all parts of the country.
The elite in the TPLF owned almost all businesses in Tigray. Some of the firms are registered as NGO and they are used for money trafficking from abroad, other parts of the country as well as soliciting contributions from Tigreans at home and abroad. The financial, import and export branches of the TPLF in Ethiopia are used to pillage the wealth of the people to fill the coffers of the TPLF leaders. The close cooperation of the TPLF with the EPLF and the Eritrean business community in Ethiopia during the first half of the 1990s facilitated secret export and import transactions. Export of livestock, coffee and the import of machinery for the TPLF companies were carried out in close cooperation with the EPLF.
The TPLF has created the impression in Ethiopia that Tigray is privileged and is developing at a breath-taking speed. The exaggerated propaganda by the TPLF about the so-called development activities in Tigray is in part tocreate the impression that the TPLF is the most efficient and development oriented organization in the EPRDF and in the country. Thus, it attempts to legitimate its rule over the EPRDF and over Ethiopia. Further, it wanted to create a cover for the transfer of wealth from the state and from abroad to the TPLF treasury. Another purpose will be to keep the people of Tigray isolated and suspected by other Ethiopians in order to use them as instrument against the opposition.
4. Political elite, multi-ethnic parties
To be continued.
